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THE NEW DEAL'S LAND UTILIZATION
PROGRAM IN THE GREAT PLAINS

GEOFF CUNFER

Drive the remote highways of the Great Plains
and you will find signs marking US Forest Service property in the midst of the nation's vast
interior grassland, a place where it could be
miles to the next tree, let alone a forest. In
fact, the Forest Service (USFS) manages several million acres of land in the Great Plains,
public land designated "National Grasslands"
and committed to grazing by private cattle
ranchers. The National Grasslands are remnants of the Great Plains past, their story
rooted in pioneer homesteads and in the

drought and depression of the 1930s. USFS
brochures explain the history of these parcels
of public land in the midst of an overwhelmingly private and treeless Great Plains:
[Nlew settlers, called "sodbusters" by some,
attempted intensive agriculture, by raising
cultivated crops rather than livestock....
Between 1905 and 1915 as a great number
of "sodbusters" came, the less desirable areas were homesteaded .... During the mid1920's, rainfall became less and less
frequent .... With little or no rain, crops
did not mature and homesteaders had nothing to harvest. ... The soil, once held in
place by the roots of native grasses and later
by the cultivated crops during the years of
good moisture, was now free to move, and
move it did! Thus began the black blizzards
which plagued the western plains for nearly
a decade.!

KEY WORDS: grazing, grasslands, Land Utilization

Program, New Deal, North Dakota, resettlement,
Soil Conservation Service

Geoff Cunfer is assistant professor of environmental
history and studies at the Center for Rural and Regional
Studies, Southwest State University, Marshall,
Minnesota. His research projects explore past
interactions between people and the natural world,
focusing especially on agriculture, agroecology, and
land use in the Great Plains.

Beginning in 1934 the federal government
repurchased 11 million acres of land from private owners and created large, federally managed grazing lands under the auspices of the
Land Utilization Program (LUP). Government
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FIG. 1. The 750,000 acre Little Missouri Land Utilization Project, North Dakota.
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managers, so the story continues, reformed
land use by revegetating cropland and converting it to pasture. Grazing was better suited
to the natural environment, and it conserved
soil and grass resources, reduced wind erosion,
and improved the quality of life for remaining
families:
Hundreds of thousands of acres were reclaimed during this lO-year period. Most
were reseeded to crested wheat-grass, a plant
introduced from Russia. In 1945, at the end
of World War II, these lands were once
again as productive as many of those that
had never been farmed. 2
This is an attractive story of tragedy and salvation. It has a bitter foe in the region's harsh
and unpredictable climate; it has victims needing rescue-destitute farmers and a fragile
natural landscape; it has heroes-federal agencies including the Soil Conservation Service
(SCS) and the Forest Service. And it has a
happy ending-a rescued grassland and prosperous ranchers.3
In fact, the Land Utilization Program did
not drastically alter basic land use in the ways
the official story asserts. The program purchased very little cropland at all. Most land
that the federal government purchased under
the LUP was not in crop production and never
had been plowed. The government intentionally left most of the plowed land in its project
areas in private ownership, and it purchased
primarily unplowed pasture land, most of
which was still in native grass. Budget restrictions by the late 1930s meant that the Land
Utilization Program was able to reseed only a
small portion of what little cropland it did
acquire. The LUP did not convert cash crop
land to grazing uses and did not reseed plowed,
exposed croplands on the majority of its purchases. What the program actually did was to
transform informal, open range ranching to
bureaucratically managed ranching. The LUP
removed squatters grazing a de facto open range
in preference for a "better" class of local ranchers who subsequently acquired exclusive ac-
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cess to federally controlled range. The story of
the LUP is a story of evolving uses of common
grasslands. 4
The largest project on the Great Plains, the
Little Missouri LUP in western North Dakota,
serves as a case study of the program. This
location is representative of the implementation of New Deal land use adjustment throughout the plains. Like most of the grassland,
western North Dakota experienced severe economic depression beginning in the 1920s and
coinciding in the mid 1930s with the worst
drought in recorded plains history. Here, as at
some two dozen other Land Utilization sites
across the region, federal land managers
stepped in after 1933 to purchase private land
from destitute farmers, rejuvenate it, and manage it for grazing, rather than for cropland.
And here too restricted budgets and a disjuncture between rhetoric and practice meant that
the Land Utilization failed to achieve its lofty
ambition to correct misuse of agricultural land
in the Great Plains. The story of the Little
Missouri Land Utilization Program presented
here illustrates the practical application and
ultimate limitations of one of the New Deal's
most ambitious land use reform efforts.
Billings, McKenzie, Golden Valley, and
Slope Counties nestle on the extreme western
edge of North Dakota, between the Little
Missouri River and the Montana state line
(Fig. O. Though mostly flat or gently rolling,
the plains descend into waves of badlands along
the Little Missouri River. Here the soft, silty
and clayey bedrock erodes from hills and cliffs
into piles of stony rubble devoid of vegetation. The badlands extend for fifteen miles on
efther side of the river and for 150 miles along
its course. In the cedar-crowded draws and on
the steep hills there is hardly a place flat
enough to run a plow. Floodplains along the
river bottom are plowable, and there are occasional high, wide divides between draws where
steady winds comb short grass. Rain is scant in
the region, averaging fifteen inches per year.
Drought is a risk every season. s Long, cold
winters prevent cattle from grazing year round,
so supplemental feeding is necessary. Every
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year stock raisers must buy or grow feed cropscorn, sorghum, oats, and hay. Otherwise, animals may starve over the winter before spring
grasses become available in April. It was in
these beautiful, unproductive badlands that
the Land Utilization Program established one
of its biggest reclamation projects.
The first Euro-American settlers moved
into western North Dakota between 1879 and
1900 to raise livestock on a vast expanse of
open pasture available for use by whomever
entered. The big land boom-ubiquitous in
Plains history-came to western North Dakota between 1900 and 1920, and it triggered
a thirty-five-year evolution of common resources from open range to private ownership
to government-regulated reserve. In 1905 the
town of Sentinel Butte was exclusively livestock country. That year it shipped out 64
railroad cars of cattle, 28 of sheep, 5 of horses,
25 of wool, but only 4 car loads of grain. 6 By
the following year, however, farmers began
to displace livestock raisers. In just two
months in 1906 the General Land Office at
Dickinson recorded over 1,400 homestead
entries. 7 Throughout 1906 the Billings County
Republican reported new arrivals weekly: "Four
more cars of emigrant movables arrived here
last Friday and Saturday. It is hard to keep
track of them all."s The county population
rose from 975 in 1900 to over 10,000 a decade
later. 9Everyone jumped at the chance to claim
a free quarter section ofland. In Sentinel Butte
the newspaper editor homesteaded a plot and
the schoolteacher left his classroom to take up
farming. 10
The Northern Pacific Railway and land
speculators joined the boom, too. In 1906 the
railroad patented 51,000 acres in Billings
County for immediate sale to settlers and
speculators. ll The biggest real estate operator
around Sentinel Butte was the Golden Valley
Land and Cattle Company, which brought
speculators from Iowa, Minnesota, and points
east to buy land. The company did a booming
business, which was capped in May 1906 when
an Iowa speculator purchased three townships-some 69,120 acresY Generous rainfall

accompanied the boom. At twenty inches,
precipitation in 1906 was 30 percent better
than average and crops did very well, with
yields of 28 to 30 bushels per acre for wheat. n
Even the ranches, forced to adjust to the loss
of open range, made money. With new farmers arriving, ranchers found a strong local
market for their horses. 14 Land prices skyrocketed, fueling speculation. During the summer
of 1906 the price of land rose from $5.00 per
acre to $17.50,15 By 1915 land agents and the
railroad listed property on the rolling plains at
between $15 and $30, with "hilly or broken"
badlands real estate starting much lower at
$7 .50. 16 Some people filed homestead claims
and then sold relinquishments as soon as possible, a procedure that could bring a swift
$1,000 profitY People moved in and out of
the area quickly, acquired land, sold at a profit,
and moved on. Yet many intended to farm,
and every week brought news of homes going
up on the plains and fences enclosing pastures. IS
In a few years farmers transformed land use
in western North Dakota, and in the process
the nature of common resources. The biggest
change was a sharp reduction in the amount of
free common grazing land available. As the
government privatized land, new owners took
action to prevent common use of their property. Advertisements flooded local newspapers
warning off trespassers. J. H. Moore advertised that he now owned the odd-numbered
sections (640 acres each) between Sentinel
Butte and Beach, and no one was to cut timber there or trespass. 19 The "odd-numbered
sections" suggests he had purchased land from
the railroad, thus removing thousands of acres
of formerly unmanaged open range from grazing access. A man from Dale, Wisconsin, wrote
to say that no one was to cut hay or graze on
his five sections of land. 20 And the biggest
landowner in the area felt the same way: "Notice. Any party or parties grazing or cutting
hay on any lands owned or contracted by the
Golden Valley Land and Cattle Co. in Billings County ... will be prosecuted to the full
extent of the law."21 In 1918 A. L. Martin put
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it succinctly: "Notice-All parties who own
or have stock in their charge that are now
grazing on lands belonging to the undersigned
that this will be no longer tolerated. These
lands are private property and not public commons, and I am entitled to the sole use of
them."22
Although landownership changed quickly,
sod busters had plowed only a small portion of
the North Dakota grassland before the beginning of the LUP. The primary cash crop in the
three-county area was wheat, which grew from
3 acres in 1899 to 37,725 acres in 1909, then
skyrocketed in the next decade to 132,968
acres. By 1929 farmers planted 274,576 acres
of wheat. These acreages are significant and
the increase was swift, but this plow-up took
place in a region of 2,178,560 acres, meaning
that at the peak of the wheat boom in 1929
only 13 percent of the three counties' total
area was devoted to wheat. Farmers grew corn
and oats to feed their livestock through severe
northern winters, with acreages varying between 14,000 and 69,000 acres, or between 1
and 3 percent of total land area. Altogether,
plowed land never exceeded about 20 percent
of the entire three-county area. The other 80
percent of land remained in native grass, but
ranges experienced increasing use as well. Even
as plowed land encroached on former open
range, livestock numbers rose. The threecounty region had supported 21,000 cattle in
1899 when most land was in the public domain. By 1920 cattle numbers had doubled to
45,811. Thus, even unplowed land was more
intensively used by 1930.13
The economic boom faltered by the end of
World War I, and social and economic crises
mounted in the Little Missouri region. First,
the good rains ceased. Rainfall was a dismal 9
inches in both 1917 and 1919. Between 1921
and 1931 rainfall in Golden Valley and Billings Counties was below the IS-inch average
for 8 of 11 years, and for 7 of the 11 in Slope
County.24 The counties issued bonds, using
the revenue to offer small feed-and-seed loans
to farmers unable to provide their own. In
1918 Golden Valley County issued 125,000
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dollars in bonds for seed loans, and in 1921
Billings County issued 90,000 dollars' worth.
Fourteen years later Billings had repaid none
of that money and had borrowed more. 25 As
poor crop followed poor crop, farmers packed
up and left without repaying loans or outstanding property taxes. The Sentinel Butte Review
reported a steady flow of farmers giving up at
the end of the 1925 season. 26 Between 1920
and 1930 population dropped by nearly 1,500
in the three counties, a 12 percent declineY
As of 1935, 49 percent of 1928 property taxes
in Billings County remained unpaid, along
with 59 percent of those for 1929 and 58 percent from 1930. 28 County debts climbed, loan
repayment was slow or nonexistent, and tax
income plummeted as people left. And all of
this happened in the 1920s, before the stock
market crash, before the Great Depression,
and before the ferocious drought of the next
decade.
Between 1900 and 1930 the federal government privatized the public domain lands of
western North Dakota, but the venture was
only partially successful. Privatization took
hold on the upland plains but not in the badlands. By the 1920s almost no public domain
was left to homestead. And yet, most of the
badlands still functioned as a common range.
The badlands were simply too poor to recompense small farm or livestock operations, let
alone repay speculative investments made at
boom-time prices. The badlands were a patchwork of unsold railroad land, state-owned
school land, absentee-owned range seldom
visited by its owners, who often lived in other
states, and the small homesteads of latecomer's who had been squeezed out of better farmland on the plains but who nonetheless tried
to survive in the beautiful, impoverished canyons. As the 1920s came to a close, badlands
acreage reverted to the counties when landowners defaulted on property taxes. There was
no one to manage or oversee any of these properties, so resident stock raisers squatted on
them without permission and without charge.
A vast, common rangeland had retreated from
the wide plains but found continued refuge
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FIG. 2. A livestock corral near Medora, Billings County, North Dakota, with a badlands escarpment in the
background, July 1936. Photograph by Paul Carter. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division,
FSA-OWI Collection, LC-USF341-T-011202-B.

into the mid-twentieth century by huddling
into neglected back corners of the Great Plains.
It was here that federal land managers focused
their attention in the 1930s.
T en years of poor rainfall, poor crops, and
growing indebtedness for individual farmers
and ranchers left the community weakened
when disaster struck in 1934. That year saw a
record-setting drought during which Billings,
Golden Valley, and Slope Counties each received only 7 or 8 inches of rain. Over 240,000
acres of cropland failed that summer. 29 Grain
farmers were in dire straits, but cattle raisers
were no better off. Feed crops died, pasture
grass dried up, and hay-cutting was all but
impossible. Faced with an approaching winter
of starving livestock, ranchers sold nearly all
of their herds. The federal government stepped
in that year with a generous offer to purchase
cattle in the Great Plains at above market

prices from ranchers who needed to liquidate.
Golden Valley County stock raisers lined up
to participate, and for two months a backlog
of thousands of cattle awaited railroad cars for
shipment out on the government purchase
plan. 30 Of the 10,370 cattle in the county,
stock raisers sold more than 9,300 in 1934. 31
In Billings County 59 percent of the population was on relief in 1935, 62 percent in
McKenzie County.32 Drought continued in
1936, as rainfall again was a meager 7 or 8
inches. In fact, 1934 and 1936 were two of the
three driest years in a century of rainfall records
for western North Dakota. 33
Although the mid-1930s drought was severe across the entire Great Plains, the northern plains did not experience the "Dust Bowl"
conditions that impacted the southern and
central plains. In fact, wind erosion in the
northern Great Plains was only a minor prob-
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lem. Dust storms occasionally accompanied
drought in the northern plains, but the problem was neither persistent nor comparable to
the erosion disaster on the southern and central plains. The classic Dust Bowl region was
in the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles, eastern New Mexico and Colorado, and western
Kansas. 34 Lower temperatures, lower evapotranspiration rates, and extended spring snow
cover meant very little blowing dust on the
Dakota plains. Despite the dust storms farther
south, federal land use adjustment programs
concentrated their efforts on the northern
plains, and the Little Missouri watershed in
western North Dakota became the largest of
the Land Utilization Projects in the grassland.
The economic and agricultural disaster of
the 1930s provided an opening for experimentation with federal land use management. The
idea had begun in the 1920s among economists in agricultural colleges who proposed
removing "submarginal" land from crop production. "Submarginal" referred to land low
in productivity, unsuited for the production
of farm crops, or incapable of profitable cultivation. A "land utilization" movement
emerged in the 1920s to classify farmland as
good, poor, marginal, or submarginal, and to
forcibly retire the latter from production. Such
planning aimed to reduce farm poverty, contract chronic overproduction of farm crops,
and protect land vulnerable to damage. M. L.
Wilson of Montana State Agricultural College focused the academic movement, while
Lewis C. Gray at the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (BAE) led the effort within the
US Department of Agriculture. 35 The land
utilization movement began well before the
1930s, but the drought and dust storms of that
decade provided a fortuitous justification for
a land use policy already on the table, and
agencies such as the Soil Conservation Service and Farm Security Administration, which
benefited from increased land utilization funding, were the loudest to publicize and deplore
the Dust Bowl wracking America's heartland.
Yet 64 percent of all Land Utilization Program purchases in the Great Plains were in
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Montana, Wyoming, and the Dakotas, far
from the black blizzards of the Dust Bowl region. 36
Franklin Roosevelt initiated the Land Utilization Program in February 1934 when he
created a Land Policy Section within the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)
and transferred 25 million dollars from the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The
initial plan for the LUP was to purchase 10
million acres of submarginal land across the
country.37 The Land Utilization Program was
one experimental agency among many in the
early days of the New Deal. The program
moved through five agencies within the Department of Agriculture in as many years. First
part of the AAA, then the Resettlement Administration, Farm Security Administration,
and Gray's Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
in 1938 the LUP found some stability in the
Soil Conservation Service (SCS), where it
remained through 1953. 38 In 1954 the Forest
Service acquired responsibility for much LUP
land, soon to be called National Grasslands,
while another portion went to the Bureau of
Land Management. Between 1935 and 1946
the LUP spent 48 million dollars to purchase
11 million acres of land around the country.
By 1954 it had spent an additional 30 million
dollars developing and rehabilitating that
land. 39
The purchases of the LUP were concentrated in the Great Plains. In 1934 administrators identified the badlands along the Little
Missouri River as a likely site for a Land Utilization Program. They divided the region into
two initial purchase areas. The areas in
McKenzie County they labeled ND-l. The
section that lay primarily in Billings County,
overlapping into the eastern townships of
Golden Valley County, they dubbed ND-2. In
1937, with passage of the Bankhead-Jones
Farm Tenant Act, the North Dakota LUP
expanded with the addition of two new projects
adjacent to the old ones. ND-38-23 added several townships of land to the eastern edge of
ND-2 in Billings County. ND-38-21 was on
the southern border of the earlier projects in
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Slope County. By the early 1940s administrators consolidated all of these projects into a
single unit, ND-24. When the Forest Service
took over in 1954 the entire project became
the Little Missouri National Grassland, which
now contains some 750,000 acres of federally
owned land acquired under the LUP.40
Although by 1934 the federal government
had disposed of the public domain in western
North Dakota, an enormous acreage remained
unoccupied and unmanaged, comprising an
informal, uncontrolled commons. On ND-2's
700,000 acres only 5 percent remained in the
public domain. State school lands made up
9 percent and the Northern Pacific Railway
owned 10 percentY Nonresidents owned 48
percent of the area. These were former homesteaders who had abandoned their farms, regional operators who lived in nearby towns,
and distant investors who had speculated in
land. Resident farmers and ranchers leased
some of this absentee-owned land, but a great
deal of it was completely unmanaged. Resident owners occupied only 23 percent of the
badlands and surrounding area. These were
small operators who had homesteaded 160
acres or purchased similar tracts from the railroad or from a land company in the past
twenty years. Much of their land was both
mortgaged and tax delinquent. Billings and
Golden Valley Counties owned 5 percent of
the land in ND-2-tax deed lands recently
confiscated for failure to pay property taxes. 42
The counties had no mechanism for managing ranches and would have preferred to keep
such land in the tax base. The badlands of
western North Dakota were so poor that
much of them remained unoccupied long after the federal government had distributed
free land to citizens, private corporations, and
the state.
Some small-holders and tenants continued
to try making a living in the badlands, but
they were not cash crop wheat farmers. About
two-thirds of the occupied land was operated
by owners and one-third by renters, but regardless of status farmers in the badlands relied on livestock raising as their primary

occupationY They grazed cattle, sheep, and
a few horses on the rugged ranges around
Medora and Sentinel Butte. Residents grazed
stock on land they owned and leased but also
on unoccupied land. Many were squatters.
Government surveyors found that most residents relied on land they neither owned nor
rented, nor even had permission to use. A
common description of local farm units was
"Considerable land grazed in common with
other operators free of charge." Most had legitimate use of a home plot and some range,
and simply expanded onto nearby unused
land, but some operators owned nothing. Describing one rancher, a surveyor commented
that "This operator is squatting on present
location and is just using other land he claims
to be renting."44 There was plenty of land to
squat on. Neither public domain, state school
land, county tax deed land, nor Northern Pacific property had any formal management or
any person to oversee its use. Private land
owned by absentees was often unsupervised
as well. These categories comprised some
525,000 acres in the area, and several hundred small stock raisers put it to use in a haphazard way. Farmers may have had incentive
to graze as many cattle or sheep as possible on
unmanaged land, reserving profits to themselves while sharing the costs of overgrazing
with distant landowners and other squatters. 45
In 1937 the government recorded some overgrazing but it was not percieved as excessive.
In a hint at a communal solution to the "tragedy of the commons," government officials alluded to informal agreements between
neighboring squatters delineating who would
make use of which lands. 46 The local community negotiated internally about how best to
manage its common range. Most residents
plowed a small amount of cropland, too, usually on land they owned or rented. Winter
feed for livestock was essential, and farmers
either grew feed crops or purchased supplements. Many also planted cash grains, mostly
wheat, but in very small amounts. In 1934
farmers in the area planted 38,000 acres in
wheat, just 5 percent of the total areaY
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Despite the small acreages involved, federal administrators exaggerated the role of
wheat farming and identified it as the primary
land use problem in the badlands. Cash grain
farming on unsuitable land had been the target of the land utilization movement in the
1920s, and removing such land from production had political appeal in Washington. So
administrators continued to use the rhetoric,
even though it did not apply to the local situation. The May 1935 Final Plan for ND-2 said,
"The purpose of the project is to remove submarginal lands from commercial grain production and shift them to a grazing use."48 Five
months later the General Development Plan
echoed those words: "The purpose of the
project is to remove low grade crop lands from
commercial grain production and shift them
to a grazing use for which they are best fitted."49 In December of that year, the message
was repeated: "The development contemplates
an adjustment in present usage of low grade
crop lands for commercial grain production to
grazing use for which such lands are naturally
adapted . . . . Farmers have cultivated large
acreages .... Unproductive lands will be removed from grain crop production, restored
to the original vegetative cover and returned
to grazing."5o Federal managers in North Dakota misled their superiors in Washington with
such language. In February 1936, an auditor
in Washington evaluating a 143,000-dollar
funding request reported, "This project . . .
involves grazing and 'hay vegetative' developments on 273,158 acres of infertile crop
lands."51 He apparently was under the impression that practically all of the land so far purchased under the LUP had been plowed,
because that was the message administrators
in North Dakota conveyed. A year later another auditor in Washington evaluating a
180,000-dollar request made the same assumption: "The purpose of this project is to
remove submarginal crop land from commercial grain production and shift it to grazing use
for which it is best fitted."52 With only 5 percent of the 700,000 acre target area actually
plowed for cash crops, such language by fed-
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eral managers was disingenuous. In August
1937, three years into the proj ect, W. F.
Dickson, in charge of the Lincoln, Nebraska,
Soil Conservation Service office, laid out his
justification for the project. From the initial
accurate statement that "This project involves
the purchase of approximately 277,818 acres
of low grade farm lands and untilled native
grass lands to be converted to a controlled
grazing use," he later shifted back to the standard line:
The area in which this project is located
has been subjected to an incorrect land use
through the homesteading of small tracts
with a view to cash crop farming operations. Because of the high crop risk which
exists in the area, the standards of living for
those who depend on cash crops have become very low .... The correct fundamental use of this area is the production of
livestock.
An attached memo says, "the fundamental
adjustment is from cash crop farming to livestock production, the use for which this area
is best fitted."53
What government administrators actually
changed on the LUP was the management of
common range lands, taking control away
from poor local ranchers and placing it in the
hands of government experts. This move mirrored the conservation ideology applied by
Gifford Pinchot's Forest Service to wooded
lands at the turn of the century. The LUP was
part of a broadening of conservation ideology
during the New Deal to encompass agricultural land and rivers as well as forests. LUP
managers developed a plan that would allow
them to control chaotic and inefficient grazing practices. 54 The first step was to purchase
submarginal lands. This was the most decisive
way to acquire control over their use, and there
were plenty of willing sellers. The second step
was resettlement-moving "uneconomical"
small operators out of the area. Third came
range rehabilitation, which encompassed
revegetation of plowed land, restoration of
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overgrazed range through resting, delimitation
of logical pasture units through rational fencing, and water development. Water would be
key to the success of stage four: controlled
grazing by remaining middle-class stock raisers. Fewer operators would have larger, more
economical ranches. The government would
ensure that no more cattle were put on the
grass than could be supported sustainably.55
In implementing the first phase of its program on ND-2, the Department of Agriculture purchased mostly pasture in native grass.
When administrators proposed the project in
1934 they estimated that it would eventually
consume 56,000 acres of cropland (11 percent) and 464,000 acres of rangeland (89 percent).56 After appraisal and optioning, and as
purchases began in earnest, the numbers were
similar: the government planned to buy 53,604
acres of cropland (10 percent) plus 459,700
acres of untilled range (90 percent)Y Funding constraints resulted in more modest actual
acquisitions, and an evaluation in January
1936, when most initial purchases were complete, was that ND- 2 would retire 19,432 acres
of cropland (7 percent) with 268,568 acres of
pasture (93 percent) comprising the bulk of
purchases. 58 Roughly half of the cropland was
probably devoted to feed crops for livestock
and not to wheat. 59 Despite its rhetoric of converting land use from cash cropping to pasture, only about 7 percent of the newly
acquired property on ND-2 was in crops and
probably under 10,000 acres of the 277,000
initially purchased was planted to cash grain.
The boundaries of the Little Missouri LUP
were drawn around the Little Missouri badlands in a way that excluded wheat cropping
areas of the region. Sentinel Butte township
in Golden Valley County is a good example
because it straddles the edge of the project.
The western half of the township is on the flat
upland plains while the eastern half falls into
eroded badlands. The year before the LUP
began, 113 farmers grew wheat on the upland
plains half of Sentinel Butte township, but
only 14 grew wheat on the badlands half. Yet
the LUP purchased land only in the badlands

half of the township, leaving the true cash
crop farming areas alone. Nearly all of the
badlands half of the township is now in the
National Grassland while farmers continue to
grow wheat on private land on the upland half.
If the government wanted to retire cash grain
farming in the dry plains, it chose the wrong
half of Sentinel Butte township for purchase. 60
The LUP transformed access to resources
more than land use itself. The government
bought entire farms, so retiring cropland meant
also buying the pasture land associated with
it. But in most cases farmers were cultivating
only the best land on their property and grazing the poorer land. Ensuring that remaining
stock raisers could provide adequate winter
feed for their cattle was a serious concern for
government officials. In some instances SCS
transferred acquired cropland to remaining
ranchers for use in growing feed crops, thus
explicitly not retiring from production some
of the little cropland it purchased. The Final
Plan of May 1935 included the following recommendation:

In view of the fact that limited areas or
tracts of so-called "submarginal land" are
in reality fair to good crop lands, and further, since a number of resident stockmen
do not now own a sufficient amount of crop
land for the production of supplementary
winter feed for their livestock, it is recommended that limited areas or tracts of suitably located crop lands be made available
for purchase by the stockmen who need such
lands to block out economic ranch units. 6l
Nearly all of the land in ND-2 had been used
as range prior to acquisition. The small portion that was cropped was the better land,
mostly used for feed crops to support livestock
operations, and federal managers worked to
maintain some of that land in feed cultivation.
Although the badlands along the Little
Missouri River are exceptionally poor farmland, the practice of land use adjustment in
North Dakota was typical of the Land Utiliza-
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FIG. 3. An upland wheat farm near Beach, Golden Valley County, North Dakota, at the depth of the drought,
July 1936. Photograph by Arthur Rothstein. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA-OWI
Collection, LC-USF34-005117 -D.

tion Program in general. The purchase of
rangeland in overwhelming proportion to
cropland was not restricted to the North Dakota site. On the southern plains the Mills
Land Use Adjustment Project was in the center of the Dust Bowl in eastern New Mexico. 62
Administrators there described numerous
farms ruined by eroded soils and drifted dunes
of blown sand. Despite the wind erosion problem on the southern plains, the New Mexico
project was much smaller than that in North
Dakota. Federal agents had purchased only
73,112 acres ofland by 1940. Of that, 19,085
acres, or 26 percent, had been in cultivation.
Restricted rehabilitation budgets meant that
most of that land was left to revegetate on its
own, which it did quickly. The project planned
to reseed only 2,500 acres. 63 On the Mills
project the government reseeded less than 4
percent of the land it purchased. In the heart
of the Dust Bowl the Department of Agriculture acquired a higher percentage of plowed
land than in North Dakota, but even there

three quarters of the property it bought was
already used as rangeland. Despite the emphasis of the Soil Conservation Service and the
Forest Service on the conversion of plowed
land to range and the mitigation of wind erosion, the LUP retired very little land devoted
to cash crops, reseeded less, and did not focus
its efforts on the region of greatest wind erosion activity.
In 1937 Congress reenergized the Land
Utilization Program with the Bankhead-Jones
Farm Tenant Act. Title III of the law gave the
LUP 50 million dollars. Congress would later
reduce that appropriation, but in the meantime land purchases resumed. Title III instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to
"develop a program of land conservation and
land utilization, including the retirement of
lands which are submarginal or not primarily
suitable for cultivation." In North Dakota,
project manager M. B. Johnson moved to acquire more land for ND-2 in Billings and
Golden Valley Counties. The language in Title
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III seemed to require the retirement of cultivated land only, and this caused planners some
concern. They were careful to incorporate the
law's words in justifying new purchases in western North Dakota. In 1937 C. F. Clayton wrote
to Paul Koenig, head of acquisition, describing
the type ofland he intended to add to ND-2:
As a general rule the tracts are devoted
largely to the production of cash crops in
an area best adapted to a grazing economy.
The tracts were taken up at one time as
homesteads and came to be operated mainly
on a cash crop basis .... The purpose of the
project is to remove sub-marginal crop land
from commercial grain production and shift
it to grazing use. 64
In early 1938 the purchase went forward. The
department added 14,120 acres to ND-2, of
which only 2,595 acres were cultivated land,
the remainder range. 65 Despite the specific
legal requirements of Title III, only 19 percent of the new acquisition was plowed. Land
purchased in the new ND-38-23 area apparently did not even reach that standard. In one
lot of sixteen parcels comprising 4,560 acres
there were only 320 acres of abandoned cropland to be retired-7 percent of the total. 66
As the slow legal process of accepting options, clearing title, and resettling residents
moved forward through 1936, initial land rehabilitation got under way on ND-2. Now the
Resettlement Administration would have a
chance to put into action the plan its administrators had for years anticipated: restoring
the land to health and rationalizing resource
use. Now that ownership had been recast, the
social structure of the land had to be rearranged by removing families, obliterating
farmsteads, and most importantly-both symbolically and ecologically-refencing the land
to reflect a controlled grazing commons. Under the old, uncontrolled grazing system, fences
were of uncertain quality, sometimes poorly
maintained, and as often as not simply absent.
Government optioners had difficulty describing landownership accurately because prop-

erty boundaries were not marked on the ground
with fencesY The Department of Agriculture
set out to remedy such chaos. Employees removed 150 miles of old fence on ND-2, rearranged grazing units, and built 120 miles of
new fence to divide the range more "rationally."68
A key to rationalizing resource use was water
development. Getting the most use possible
out of the grassland meant spacing livestock
evenly. This would allow maximum consumption of the resource without overgrazing popular spots. Fences supported livestock spacing,
but water developments were the most important tool. Cattle graze near a water source and
do not stray far from it. Having only a few
watering sites on a range means overuse of
grass around water locations and underuse of
grass distant from water. The project put more
effort into water developments than any other
category of range improvements, developing
springs, building impoundment and diversion
dams, and drilling wells powered by windmills.
Reseeding croplands to grass was one of the
most difficult rehabilitation projects SCS tackled. Despite ambitious goals, the LUP was able
to replant only a small amount of land to grass.
By 1939 the Resettlement Administration and
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics had reseeded only 5,084 acres on the entire 750,000acre Little Missouri project. 69 Considering the
rhetorical weight the program placed on the
conversion of cropland to grassland, reseeding was an important symbol in land rehabilitation. The majority of fields to be reseeded
had been abandoned for several years by the
time SCS was ready to return them to grass. In
that time they went through the early stages
of ecological succession, initially growing over
with annual weeds, then shifting to native
grasses and forbs on their own. 70 After the
early lull in cropland reclamation, reseeding
increased in 1940 and 1941. The SCS had
ambitious plans for the LUP. In early 1941 it
projected that 94,217 acres needed seeding
to grass. 71 By mid-April the estimate had
dropped to 60,000 acres.n At the end of 1941
planners hoped to reseed only 40,000 acres. 73
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FIG. 4. North Dakota farmers awaiting payment in a Resettlement Administration office, July 1936. Photograph
by Arthur Rothstein. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSZ-OWI Collection, LC-

USF34-005141-E.

Reseeding estimates did not decline because
the LUP had succeeded in planting 50,000
acres in the course of the year. By mid-1941
the project had reseeded only 15,383 acres. 74
In 1941 manager M. B. Johnson's superiors
hoped to use a five-man crew on each of four
tractors, running for sixteen hours a day beginning 1 September and working until the
first freeze. At that rate, they estimated they
could\ seed 22,500 acres a year for four years
and finish the job. 75 But manpower shortages
and other work commitments interfered with
seeding plans. Slow seed supplies, the experimental nature of the work, and, most importantly, limited budgets held accomplishments
far below goals. In the spring season of 1942

administrators planned to replant 2,525 acres
but succeeded in seeding only 380. 76 That year
Johnson complained that the only man available to run a reseeding tractor refused to work
f9r the low wages-$3.33 per day-the SCS
was allowed to pay, and that no seeding was
likely to be done for the foreseeable future. 77
In the fall he expected to rely solely on volunteer labor for the project. 78 It is not clear precisely how much land the government finally
replanted to grass on the Little Missouri. As of
fall 1942, eight years into the project, the LUP
had seeded only 18,400 of the approximately
750,000 acres in the project. 79 Additional acreage may have received treatment after 1942,
but with World War II, the end of the drought,
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and economic recovery from the depression,
the urgency of the LUP seemed diminished,
and funding declined steadily.
When reseeding was finished, old fences
obliterated and new ones built, families and
homesteads removed, ponds constructed and
springs developed, the birth of the LUP was
complete. By the mid-1940s the government
had turned range chaos into rational grass use.
The task now was to maintain proper range
use into the indefinite future. Work had revolved around rehabilitation of damaged resources in the first eight years. Proper
management of that rejuvenated grassland
would be an ongoing task. Government officials wanted people to use the reserve fully
and efficiently but also sustainably. The practical implementation of such land use required
the creation of local grazing associations comprised of the "better" area stock raisers who
remained after the removal of less efficient
opera tors. 80
The Medora Grazing Association (MGA),
which came to control federal lands in ND-2
and ND-38-23, is representative of the newly
created institution. 8! There-were three requirements for joining the association. First, ranchers must be "dependent" upon the reserved
land. A stock raiser was considered dependent
on grazing lands controlled by the association
when the operating unit was "within or near
the exterior boundaries of the grazing district
and such lands are necessary for the economic
operation of the ranch unit." Second, participating ranchers must have grazed cattle in the
area prior to September 1934. The final requirement for membership was "commensurability." This referred to a stock raiser's ability
to feed livestock over the winter when range
grass was not available. A rancher had to own
or lease enough private land to grow feed crops,
cut hay, and put livestock on winter pasture
for the four months they were not allowed on
the federal reserve. Commensurable land included winter pasture, land cultivated in feed
crops, and alfalfa or native hay meadows. A
user had to be able to produce a quarter ton of
roughage per animal grazed on the reserve. 82

Because the LUP wanted to support middleclass ranchers rather than large operations,
access to the reserve was capped at a maximum of 350 cattle per rancher, a limit that
remains in effect today.83 Grazing fees were
variable from year to year, allowing managers
to reduce them during droughts when money
was tight. 84 Small, poor ranchers who remained
in the area could not qualify to join the MGA
and no longer had access to free use of lands
they did not own. The grazing association was
made up of local people, not absentees. It consisted of established stock raisers rather than
newcomers. And it was an association of family operations with access to good private land,
buildings, and homes within the boundaries
of the grazing district or immediately adjacent
to it. By 1938 nearly three quarters of remaining stock raisers in the area had joined the
MGA.85
To extend its influence without additional
cost, the government insisted that the grazing
associations lease as much of the remaining
private land within the district as possible. 86
Government planners realized that there were
cheaper ways to adjust land use than by buying property. One effect of the piecemeal acquisition process was a checkerboard pattern
of ownership. Private property, federal property, and state, county, and railroad land intermingled. By requiring the grazing association
to lease intermixed private land, and then to
apply the same grazing program to all land it
controlled, the government regulated land use
on additional property without purchasing it.
By 1940 the Medora and McKenzie County
Grazing Associations grazed 821,624 acres of
land, of which 575,067 acres were federally
owned. Thus the government controlled the
stocking rate on an additional quarter million
acres that it did not own. 87
The most important issue for range management is carrying capacity, the amount of
land necessary to support an animal without
land degradation. 88 On the new reserve the
government had the right to establish the carrying capacity, and grazing associations were
bound to limit range use at that level on both
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their federal and private land. In case of
drought the government could further curtail
stocking rates. 89 Initially, government managers were uncertain how many cattle the North
Dakota badlands could support. Before the
Land Utilization Program the average operator in the badlands controlled 2,000 acres, on
which he grazed 83 cattle, a stocking rate of
24 acres per animal for twelve months. 90 Federal administrators initially established the
very same stocking rate for the reserve, but for
only eight months each year. In 1940 they
reduced it to 28 acres before a careful range
survey established 20 acres per animal over
eight months as an acceptable carrying capacity, a rate that would put more cattle on the
range than had been there before the LUP.91
There may have been good reason for this, as
federal fencing and water developments distributed cattle more evenly across the grassland.
Federal attempts to establish a sustainable
stocking rate were mostly academic in the first
decade of the LUP. Actual grazing was far below these theoretical carrying capacities. The
1934-1936 drought cut livestock numbers drastically across western North Dakota.92 On ND2, although government managers determined
there was room for 14,555 cattle in 1938, the
MGA could only muster 1,146 animals to stock
the range. 93 In that first year on federal land,
cattle grazed at the astonishing rate of 304
acres per animal. Livestock numbers increased
considerably the next year, when the stocking
rate was 70 acres per animal. 94 In 1940 herds
recovered more, so that the rate on ND-2 was
46 acres per animal. 95 This was far below the
24 acres per animal that government managers then estimated the range could support. It
took more than ten years for herds to recover;
by 1948 they nearly filled available government permits, at a rate of 28 acres per animal. 96
As livestock herds slowly grew, the range
improved. The 1934-1936 drought curtailed
grass growth but the accompanying reduction
of livestock would have allowed range recovery without government assistance. A comb i-
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nation of three good years of rain and
understocking of pastures restored the grass.
Ranchers claimed the range was in excellent
shape as early as 1939, and in 1941 the local
agricultural experiment station reported that
the grass had fully recovered. 97 This prompt
recovery suggests that the range was not seriously overstocked or badly damaged prior to
the drought and government purchase. Nonetheless, federal management ensured that
stocking rates declined, from around 24 acres
per animal for twelve months in the early 1930s
to eventually hover around 28 acres per animal for eight months a year.
As America approached World War II congressional and popular support for the Land
Utilization Program waned and operating budgets declined. Significant land purchases and
rehabilitation ceased by 1943. After the war
the economy boomed, agriculture did well, and
the LUP became a distant memory. It is an
open question what might have happened in
the North Dakota badlands without government intervention. The drought that removed
practically all cattle from the badlands in the
mid-1930s would have provided a decade-long
rest for the range, even without the LUP.
Abandoned farmland would have begun a
natural succession back to grassland. Although
full recovery of plowed ground takes a century
or more, it seems unlikely that the reseeding
done by SCS moved the process along any
faster. The LUP did reduce stocking rates
slightly below previous levels and rationalized
use of the grass resource. The LUP, with its
support for middle-class stock raisers and its
limit of 350 animals per operaror, also put
access to resources in the hands of mediumsized operators rather than either small or very
large ranchers. The program did not alter cash
crop wheat farming in the region to any great
extent.
Today, wheat farming continues on the
upland plains in western North Dakota. In
1987 Billings, Golden Valley, and Slope
County farmers devoted over 400,000 acres to
wheat cropping (in the form of wheat land
and cultivated summer fallow), 19 percent of
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the entire land area, compared to about
275,000 acres and 13 percent ofland in 1929.98
Despite claims of retiring cash grain farmland,
only about 7 percent of the property the Department of Agriculture purchased on ND-2
had been plowed. Probably half of that was
devoted to feed crops, a land use the department approved of, allowed to continue, and
encouraged in remaining stock raisers. The
LUP did not convert substantial amounts of
land from cash crop farming to grazing. Reseeding covered only about 20,000 of the
750,000 acres in the present Little Missouri
National Grassland. The badlands had been
used for grazing and still were in 1934. They
still are today. The primary consequence of
the LUP was to bring federally managed order
to private exploitation of common resources.
NOTES

Part of this research was supported by grant number 1R01 HD33554 from the National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development and by a
research stipend from the Natural Resources Conservation Service. The author would like to thank Myron
Gutmann, Douglas Helms, Dan..F'lores, and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism.
1. US Department of Agriculture (USDA),
"The National Grasslands of the Rocky Mountain
Region" (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 2-3.
2. USDA, ibid., pp. 3-4. Numerous publications
repeat this story. See Custer National Forest, "The
National Grasslands" (Billings, Mont., n.d.);
"Comanche National Grassland: A Range of Resources" (La Junta, Colo., n.d.); "Welcome to the
Comanche National Grassland" (La Junta, Colo.,
c. 1996); US Forest Service (USFS) Southwest
Region, "Welcome to the National Grasslands:
Kiowa and Rita Blanca, McClellan Creek and Black
Kettle" (Clayton, N.M., n.d.); USFS, "The National Grasslands Story" (1964).
3. See William Cronon, "A Place for Stories:
Nature, History, and Narrative," Journal of American History 78 (March 1992): 1347 -76, for a discussion of the power of a strong narrative to color our
understanding of the past.
4. Historians of the Land Utilization Program
generally follow the official narrative, though with
more subtlety and detail. See R. Douglas Hurt, "The
Morton County Land Utilization Project in the
Kansas Dust Bowl," Kansas History 19 (summer
1996): 140-53; R. Douglas Hurt, "Federal Land

Reclamation in the Dust Bowl," Great Plains Quarterly 6 (spring 1986): 94-106; Edward G. Grest,
"The Range Story of the Land Utilization Projects,"
Journal of Range Management 6 (February 1953):
44-50; H. H. Wooten, The Land Utilization Program, 1934-1964: Origin, Development, and Present
Status, Agricultural Economic Report no. 85 (Washington, 1965); Geoff Cunfer, "Common Ground:
The American Grassland, 1870-1970" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Texas, 1999), pp. 183-304.
5. Frederick P. Aziz, Soil Survey of Golden Valley County, North Dakota (SCS, 1989), pp. 2-3, 96;
Resettlement Administration (RA), "Land Use
Problems in Southwestern North Dakota," June
1937, Kenne'th W. Simmons Papers [hereafter cited
as Simmons Papers], box 2, North Dakota Heritage
Center, Bismarck [hereafter cited as NDHC], pp.
7-10; D. L. Elliott, C. G. Holladay, W. R. Barchet,
H. P. Foote, and W. F. Sandusky, Wind Energy
Resource Atlas of the United States (Golden, Colo.:
Solar Energy Research Institute, 1987), pp. 3, 60.
6. Billings County (N, Dak,) Republican [hereafter cited as BCR], 16 August, 1906, p. 1.
7. BCR, 17 May 1906, p. 1; 5 July 1906, p. 1.
8. BCR, 18 April 1906, p. 1.
9. Myron P. Gutmann, Sara M. Pullum,
Geoffrey A. Cunfer, and Delia Hagen, Great Plains
Population and Environment Database, ver. 1.0 (containing county level data from the population and
agricultural censuses, 1870-1992, for the Great
Plains states) (Austin, Tex.: Population Research
Center, University of Texas, 1998) [hereafter cited as
Great Plains Database1; see www.prc.utexas.edu/plains.
10. BCR, 21 June 1906, p. 1; 6 September 1906,
p. 6; 31 May 1906, p. 1.
11. BCR, 25 October 1906, p. 1.
12. BCR, 24 May 1906, p. 6.
13. BCR, 16 August 1906, p. 1; 20 September
1906, p. 1.
14. BCR, 12 April 1906, pp. 1,4; 31 May 1906,
p. 3; 21 June 1906, p. 1; 28 June 1906, pp. 1,6; 16
August 1906, p. 1; 20 September 1906, p. 6.
15. BCR, 17 May 1906, p. 1; 7 June 1906, p. 6;
30 August 1906, p. 1.
16. "List of Land Dealers Along the Northern
Pacific Yellowstone Park Line," 1915, NDHC.
17. BCR, 17 May 1906, p. 1; 26 July 1906, p. 6.
18. BCR, 13 September 1906, p. 1.
19. BCR, 10 May 1906, p. 6.
20. BCR, 14 June 1906, p. 4.
21. BCR, 12 April 1906, p. 6.
22. Sentinel Butte (N, Dak,) Republican [hereafter cited as SBRep], 18 April 1918, p. 1.
23. Great Plains Database (note 9 above).
24. Ibid.
25. SBRep, 21 March 1918, p. 1; Robert Byrne,
"Sub-Marginal Land Projects" draft, c. early 1935,
Robert Byrne Papers, box 4, NDHC.

THE NEW DEAL'S LAND UTILIZATION PROGRAM

26. Sentinel Butte (N. Dak.) Review [hereafter cited as
SBRev], 4 September 1925, p.1; 2 October 1925, p. 5.
27. Great Plains Database (note 9 above).
28. Submarginal Land Program Agricultural Demonstration Projects, "North Dakota Proposal No. A1/2, Little Missouri Land Adjustment Project, Final
Plan," 20 May 1935 [hereafter cited as "Final Plan")'
Land Utilization Program Papers [hereafter cited as
LUP Papers), RG 114, Finding Aid PC52, Entry 39,
box 322, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
29. Great Plains Database (note 9 above).

30. Beach Review and Sentinel Butte (N. Dak.) Review [hereafter cited as BR-SBR), 7 June 1934, p. 1; 14
June 1934, p. 1; 21 June 1934, p. 6; 28 June 1934; 12
July 1934, p. 1; 19 July 1934, p. 1; 26 July 1934, p. 1;
2 August 1934, p. 1; 9 August 1934, p. 1; 16 August
1934, p. 1; 30 August 1934, p. 1.
31. BR-SBR, 27 September 1934, p. 1; Great
Plains Database (note 9 above).
32. Byrne, "Sub-Marginal Land Projects" draft
(note 25 above).
33. Great Plains Database (note 9 above).
34. Myron P. Gutmann and Geoff Cunfer, "A
New Look at the Causes of the Dust Bowl," Publication no. 99-1 (Lubbock, Tex.: International Center for Arid and Semiarid Land Studies, 1999);
Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), pp. 30, 36-37; R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust
Bowl: An Agricultural and Social History (Chicago:
N elson-Hall, 1981), maps; Paul Bonnifield, The Dust
Bowl: Men, Dirt, and Depression (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), p. xii.
35. Wooten, Land Utilization Program (note 4 above),
pp. 1-17; Bret Wallach, At Odds With Progress: Americans and Conservation (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1991), pp. 141-55; BR-SBR, 23 August 1934, p. 3.
36. Wooten, Land Utilization Program (note 4
above), pp. 74-75.
37. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
38. Bankhead-Iones Farm Tenant Act, Public Law
210, 75th Cong., 1st sess., (22 July 1937).
39. Wooten, Land Utilization Program (note 4
above), pp. 5-19.
40. Bureau of Land Management, Area 3, Land
Planning and Classification Report, Public Domain
Lands, Little Missouri River Basin (Denver: BLM,
1959), p. 73, held at NDHC.
41. "Final Plan" (note 28 above).
42. "Little Missouri Land Adjustment Project:
Proposal for Extension ro Site No.2," 12 November 1934, LUP Papers, box 322.
43. "Final Plan" (note 28 above); Byrne, "SubMarginal Land Projects" draft (note 25 above).
44. "Farm and Ranch Surveys," 1937, Medora
Grazing Association Papers [hereafter cited as MGA
Papers), box 3, NDHC.

209

45. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science (13 December 1968): 1243-48.
46. "Farm and Ranch Surveys" (note 44 above).
47. "Little Missouri Land Adjustment Project:
Proposal for Extension to Site No.2," 12 November 1934, LUP Papers, box 322.
48. "Final Plan" (note 28 above).
49. "General Development Plan, LA-ND-2," 18
October 1935, LUP Papers, box 324.
50. RA, "Application for Authorization to Expend Funds ... ," 12 December 1935, LUP Papers,
box 324.
51. W. M. P., "Finance and Control Division,
Analysis Section," 4 February 1936, LUP Papers,
box 324.
52. George B. Mclntire, "Land Acquisition
Supplementary Development Plan, Project Analysis Report," 12 March 1937, LUP Papers, box 324.
53. W. F. Dickson, "Application for Authorization to Expend Funds ... ," 26 August 1937, LUP
Papers, box 324.
54. "Justification for a Development Program on
the Little Missouri Land Use Adjustment Project
of North Dakota (LA-ND-2)," c. 1935; "General
Development Plan" (note 49 above); "Justification
for Continuation of Development Program for LDND-2," c. February 1937; Dickson, "Application
for Authorization," ibid.; L. C. Gray, "Memorandum for the Secretary," 14 October 1937, LUP
Papers, box 324.
55. "Little Missouri Land Adjustment Project"
(note 47 above); M. B. Johnson, "Submarginal Land
Program Memorandum of Proposed Project," 28
December 1934, LUP Papers, box 322; "Final Plan"
(note 28 above).
56. Johnson, ibid.
57. "Final Plan" (note 28 above).
58. George C. Kodler, "Memorandum of Proposed
Project," 31 January 1936, LUP Papers, box 324.
59. RA, "Land Use Problems" (note 5 above).
60. BR-SBR, 16 November 1933, p. 2, 4.
61. Rex E. Willard to C. F. Clayton, 15 March 1938,
LUP papers, box 322; "Final Plan" (note 28 above).
62. See Geoff Cunfer, "An Environmental History of the Canadian River Gorge" (M.A. thesis,
Texas Tech University, 1993), pp. 79-108.
63. "Mills Land Use Adjustment Project, New
Mexico Proposal A-4," 15 May 1935; "Land Acquisition Plan (Part One), Mills Land Use Adjustment Project, Project LA-NM-5-38," 14 February
1938; "Management Plan for the Mills Land Utilization Project," 11 February 1940, all held at Kiowa
National Grassland Office, Clayton, N.M.; R. Douglas Hurt, "The National Grasslands: Origin and
Development in the Dust Bowl," Agricultural History 59 (April 1985): 246-59, reports that in six
Land Utilization Projects in the heart of the Dust
Bowl on the southern plains, including the Mills

210

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 2001

proj ect, 43 percent of the land purchased was crops,
the highest such estimate I have found. He cites
Tevis E. Wilkins and George B. McIntire, "An
Analysis of the Land Acquisition Program," USDA,
SCS, Miscellaneous Publication 26 (August 1942),
pp. 20, 23-26, 31-32, 34; McIntire was one of the
Washington administrators cited above as stating
that all of the ND-2 purchases were cropland Melissa G. Wiedenfeld, "The New Deal Land Utilization Program in Montana" (paper presented to the
American Society for Environmental History, Tucson, Arizona, April 1999), reports that 23 percent
of land purchased by the LUP in Fergus County,
Montana, was in crops, 77 percent in range.
64. C. F. Clayton to Paul L. Koenig, 6 December
1937, LUP Papers, box 323.
65. A. G. Black to Henry Wallace, 4 December
1937, LUP Papers, box 322.
66. L. P. Sullivan to F. W. Ross, with attached
list, 11 April 1940, Land Utilization Program Region 7 Office Papers, RG 114 [hereafter cited as
LUP Reg. 7 Papers], box 347, National Archives
and Records Administration, Kansas City, Mo.
67. "Final Plan" (note 28 above).
68. "Explanation and Justification of the Various Jobs
to Be Initiated by LD-ND-2," c. 19 June 1936; L. C.
Gray, "Memorandum for Dr. A. G. Black, Chief of the
Bureau," October 1937, LUP Papers, box 325.
69. "Accomplishments Report," 31 October
1939, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, bQx 348.
70. "Annual Report [1940] of the North Dakota
Agricultural Experiment Station and Agricultural
College to the Soil Conservation Service," c. early
1941, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 349.
71. Irvine T. Dietrich to Wilkie Collins,Jr., 7 March
1941, with attachment, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 349.
"Annual Report [1940], ND-LU-24," with attachments, c. 15 April 1941, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 349.
73. "Work Record (Amidon}," 31 December
1941; "Work Record (Medora}," 31 December 1941;
"Work Record (Watford City}," c. 31 December
1941, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 350.
74. Dietrich to Collins (note 71 above); "Accomplishments Report" (note 69 above); "Work
Record (Amidon)" (note 73 above).
75. Irvine T. Dietrich to Wilkie Collins Jr., 26
February 1941, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 349.
76. "Work That Should Be Completed As Soon
As Possible," c. 25 February 1942, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 349; Robert S. Stoebe to Lyness G. Lloyd,
26 May 1942, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 350.
77. Stoebe to Lloyd, ibid.
78. Irvine T. Dietrich to T. B. Randolph, 4 May
1942, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 350.
79. "Work Record (Amidon}," "Work Record
(Medora}," "Work Record (Watford City}," (note
73 above); Stoebe to Lloyd (note 76 above);
Dietrich to Collins (note 71 above).

n.

80. "Final Plan" (note 28 above); "Recommendation of Project Manager," c. June 1938, LUP Papers,
box 325.
81. BR-SBR,21 February 1935, p. 1; 28 February
1935, p. 1; "Articles of Incorporation of the Medora
Grazing Association," 11 December 1937; "Medora
Grazing Association By-Laws," 5 March 1938, LUP
Papers, box 325; Minutes of the MGA, 5 March 1938
and 9 April 1938, MGA Papers, box 1, NDHC.
82. "Rules and Regulations of the Medora Grazing
Association," c. July 1938, LUP Papers, box 325.
83. "Medora Grazing Association By-Laws"
(note 81 above); "Rules and Regulations of the
Medora Grazing Association," ibid.; "Grazing
Agreement," 1 September 1938; Minutes of the
MGA, 21 April 1939, 22 April 1939, 9 October
1939, MGA Papers, box 1; T. B. Randolph to L. B.
Burns, 5 April 1939, McKenzie County Grazing
Association Papers, NDHC.
84. "Grazing Agreement," ibid.
85. "Tabulation of Operators in Area," c. June
1938, LUP Papers, box 325.
86. "Grazing Agreement" (note 83 above).
87. "Grazing Agreement" (note 83 above); "Annual Report [1940], ND-LU-24" (note 72 above).
88. "Final Plan" (note 28 above); Minutes of the
MGA, 17 March 1939, MGA Papers, box 1, NDHC.
89. "Grazing Agreement" (note 83 above).
90. "Annual Report [1941] of the North Dakota
Agricultural Experiment Station and Agricultural
College to the Soil Conservation Service," c. early
1942, LUP Reg. 7 Papers, box 350.
91. "Treasurer's Annual Report," 26 June 1939,
MGA Papers; E. H. Aicher to Lyness G. Lloyd, 4
December 1940, LUP Reg. 7 papers, box 349; "Annual Report [1940], ND-LU-24" (note 72 above);
"Annual Report [1941] of the North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station," ibid.
92. C. E. Offutt to C. F. Clayton, c. spring 1938,
LUP Papers, box 325; Medora Stockgrowers Association to William Lemke, 11 February 1939, LUP
Papers, box 322.
93. Don L. Short, "Statement of Facts," 19 June
1939, LUP Papers, box 325.
94. "Treasurer's Annual Report" (note 91 above);
A. E. McClymonds, "Schedule for the Medora Grazing Association for the Grazing Season of May 1,
1939 to December 31, 1939," c. April 1939, LUP
Papers, box 325.
95. "Annual Report [1940], ND-LU-24" (note
72 above).
96. "Medora Grazing Assn. Report," Billings County
Pioneer, 6 January 1949, in MGA Papers, NDHC.
97. Medora Stockgrowers Association to Lemke
(note 92 above); "Annual Report [1941] of the North
Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station" (note 90
above).
98. Great Plains Database (note 9 above).

